Transition Report 2005 press conference, Monday 14 November 2005
STEVEN FRIES: Good afternoon. It is a pleasure to have this opportunity to
present to you and discuss with you our twelfth Transition Report. This is, I
think, one of our more unique reports in that it draws on and benefits very
significantly from our business environment and enterprise performance survey,
which is a large-scale survey of businesses right across eastern Europe that
we have conducted every three years together with the World Bank. The first
round was in 1999, the second round in 2002 and the third round in 2005. I
think this gives quite a unique insight into what is happening on the ground
in terms of business development and business performance in the transition
countries of eastern Europe. To make it even more interesting, we have run a
benchmarking survey in a number of west European countries, Germany, Greece
and Portugal, which helps us to put the transition economies in a broader
context and a broader perspective.
I shall say a few words about the key findings from the survey in a moment,
but before I come to the key conclusions of the report let me say a little
about the other aspects of this year’s Transition Report. As you may be aware,
having seen previous reports and had an opportunity to at least glance through
this year’s report, there is a chapter which updates our assessment on
progress in transition and progress in structural and institutional reform
across all 27 countries of the region where the EBRD operates and also takes a
close look at the macroeconomic performance prospects and risks in the region.
To give you a few of the highlights in terms of progress in transition, it is
quite interesting that we see a new driver of reform in the region,
particularly in the countries of central Europe and south-eastern Europe,
namely the EU process. The prospect of EU accession has been a key driver of
reform. The most advanced countries, the new EU8 members, the countries of
central Europe and the Baltic, took a bit of a pause in reform after having
acceded to the EU. You may recall from last year’s report that this was a
theme that we stressed quite strongly. Encouragingly, we saw a reinvigoration
of reforms in the new EU8 members and we see this now being a market-driven
process rather than an EU-driven process. It is driven by the need for better
corporate governance, better business practices, better access to financial
services that come with operating in a more globally challenging environment,
deeper international integration within the European economy and growing
competitive pressures worldwide. We now see reforms in that group of countries
as being market-driven.
In south-east Europe we have seen the countries take a bit of a reform
breather, with the notable exception of Serbia and Montenegro, which continued
to move forward quite strongly despite a relatively weak coalition government.
In the CIS we have seen a number of countries move forward in reforms but
largely in those countries where there have been key political changes, such
as Georgia and Ukraine, and a shift in political orientation in Moldova, which
have been key to underpinning forward movement in reform in those countries.
On the macro side, we have seen another good year for the transition
countries, though not as good as in 2004 when the region as a whole grew by
6.6 per cent. In 2005 we are looking at a moderation of growth to around 5.3
per cent for all the countries of the region.
As to a geographical breakdown, we still see the CIS countries as the
strongest growth performers, forecasting growth for the CIS countries as a
whole, including Russia, at around 6 per cent, in the countries of
south-eastern Europe, Romania, Bulgaria, and so forth, at around 4.8 per cent
and in those countries in central Europe and the Baltics, the new EU member
states, at around 4.2 per cent. These are growth rates which we see as being
largely in line with the potential rate of output growth, so these are rates
that we think these countries can sustain over the medium term.
Looking forward, it is important to realise the risks that the countries run
from the macroeconomic perspective. We have detailed quite carefully in the
report where we see the macroeconomic vulnerabilities and the other risks.
One issue we take quite a close look at is that of risks or vulnerabilities
within the financial sectors in the region. We felt it was important to take a
close look at this issue because of the rapid growth in domestic credit that
we are seeing in all of the countries. Of course, the rapid expansion of
domestic credit is part of the growth story, and it is a positive story, but
at the same time we know from experience in other countries that episodes of
rapid credit growth can be associated with subsequent bouts of financial
instability or difficulties. Therefore the key issue we look at is how
sustainable this credit expansion is. Part of it is just a natural catch-up
process. We saw it in other countries, in Spain and Portugal, for example,
when they acceded to the European Union. We took a close look at the nature of
the risk to the financial sector both from a macro perspective and from a
prudential perspective.
In terms of the key findings from the business environment survey, the story
is largely a positive one for the region, in two senses. The first is that,
since we first ran the survey in 1999, it being primarily a survey of local
business, not foreign investors, there has been a sustained improvement in the
business environment across a range of dimensions, from the predictability of
business regulation to the effectiveness of tax administration, the ability to
access financial services and various features of the institutional
environment, such as confidence in the courts, the incidence of corruption and
the significance of crime from a business perspective. In most but not all
cases we see a significant improvement.
A dimension of the business environment that our survey looks at which
portrays a deteriorating trend is that of labour regulation. Over the years
businesses perceive labour regulation as an increasing constraint on their
capacity to grow and to develop their business. Of course, labour regulation
is a complex issue. It benefits workers and can afford them a degree of
protection but it also constrains the flexibility and capacity of businesses
to adjust. The key point here is that from a business perspective it is
becoming an increasing obstacle.
The other perspective on the business environment that it is useful to note is
the comparison with the more mature market economies in western Europe. Here
we see some convergence towards, but not yet achieving, the levels of the
quality of the business environment that we see in the more mature market
economies that we have surveyed, which are Germany, Greece and Portugal.
There is more to do in terms of reform in these areas.
Lastly, the survey looks at the performance of businesses and the important
contribution that different types of firms make to the growth story of the
region, particularly the role of foreign-owned firms in boosting productivity
as well as new entrants into the markets, new private businesses. In terms of
the types of firms that are leading the growth charge in the region, those are
the key ones that the survey has identified.
That is, by way of introduction, a quick overview of the key findings of the
report on progress in transition from a macro perspective as well as some of
the key findings from this year’s business environment and enterprise
performance survey. My colleagues and I should be happy to answer any
questions you might have.
VERONIKA REINIGER (Nepszabadsag Hungarian Daily): Hungary is one of only two
countries which is criticised because obstacles to business have increased
since 2002. Hungary was also heavily criticised by ECOFIN and the EU
Commission because of the double deficits. I should be grateful if you would
elaborate on EBRD's view on the state of the Hungarian economy and the
obstacles to business that you mentioned.
STEVEN FRIES: It is important to hear what local businesses are saying in
terms of the obstacles that they perceive. I think that what we see is the
consequence of a relatively slow pace of structural and institutional reform
in Hungary over the course of the past several years, with the exception of
the financial sector, where I think the Hungarian Government has moved
forward, certainly in improving the depth and quality of financial
intermediation. What you see is perhaps the consequence of a lack of a strong
reform drive in improving aspects of the administration of the judiciary in
Hungary.
On the macro side, one of the issues we highlight on Hungary’s macroeconomic
performance is the fiscal position and the reclassification of the budget
deficit this year because of the accounting for the government’s investment
programme. Properly accounted for, we are looking at a general government
deficit of 6 per cent of GDP, which is well off the level required for
accession to economic and monetary union and, before that, participation in
ERM II. I think that from a fiscal perspective the Hungarian Government has a
long way to go in terms of consolidating the fiscal position and moving on to
the next phase of the European integration process, which is ERM II and
accession to economic and monetary union. The challenges are clearly there
from a macro perspective as well as with regard to improving public
administration and economic governance. On the latter, that is the voice of
Hungarian businesses. They do not see real improvement over the last three
years and indeed they see some deterioration.
ANDREI MARAWSKI (La Tribune): How would you assess the situation in Poland?
We have a new government that has already sent strong signals, making the
difference between productive investment and non-productive investment, saying
that they will not look for a balanced budget but then again saying that they
might delay the programme for entering the euro zone. Does the situation
represent a major shift and something that could be followed by other
governments?
STEVEN FRIES: Certainly the tone and the rhetoric of the new Polish government
represents a shift. It is clearly more populist in its orientation. It has
questioned the value of foreign direct investment, particularly in the retail
sector but also elsewhere. It has perhaps questioned the pace of fiscal
consolidation and indeed there has been some weakening of the zloty recently,
reflecting what may be concerns about the pace of fiscal consolidation going
forward.
I would make a couple of points. The first is to emphasise the strong benefits
that can be delivered from openness to investment in all forms, including
investment from foreign businesses. One of the key findings from our
Transition Report is that foreign businesses do bring in a lot in terms of
higher levels of productivity and performance, so not welcoming foreign
investment is really a forgone opportunity for the country and for the people
who would have the opportunity to work in those businesses and earn the higher
wages that higher productivity can deliver. It is important not to lose sight
of the benefits of foreign investment and all that it can bring. It is not a
cure-all but it brings certain benefits and should be welcomed.
Secondly, on the macro side, in contrast to Hungary where we saw a widening of
the fiscal deficit over the course of the past year, we have seen some modest
improvement. In Poland this is primarily a growth-driven phenomenon, not
driven by changes in fiscal policy. I think that, looking forward, the key
thing is to maintain the gradual strategy of fiscal consolidation and the
ultimate accession to economic and monetary union that the government and the
Central Bank had previously set out for the country. I think those aims are
achievable in the Polish context. They require tough political choices,
particularly on government spending, but I think it would ultimately deliver
more growth and more confidence in the Polish economy.
GABRIEL PARTOS (BBC World Service): Mr Fries, last year’s report referred to a
reform pause in central Europe, which was understandable given that they had
just joined the EU. This year you are talking about a similar pause in
south-eastern Europe, which makes less sense to me, given that they are still
accession countries in some cases or indeed candidate countries. What is your
explanation for the fact that, with the exception of Serbia and Montenegro,
they are not proceeding with reforms as quickly as they should be?
STEVEN FRIES: I think it is rather similar to what we observed in the EU8
countries. The pace of reform was quite strong in the run-up to agreeing a
formal accession timetable and meeting all the requirements of the acquis and
associated structural and institutional reforms that are picked up with our
transition indicators. Certainly, a lot more needs to be done in the two
countries that are set to join in 2007, Romania and Bulgaria, particularly in
the area of governance, the functioning of the courts and the quality of
public administration, and indeed those are not so much issues picked up in
our transition indicators, which essentially look at market liberalisation,
privatisation and certain areas of institutional reform, but are broader
challenges in terms of legal reform and of the quality of public
administration and governance, law and order issues and the fight against
corruption, and so on, in both of those countries, which are key challenges
going forward. Clearly, there is no room for complacency in those countries.
PAUL HANNON (Dow Jones): A theme in some of the areas you have talked about so
far is the reluctance of the new members of the European Union to do very much
to advance the date at which they will ultimately join the euro zone. All
across the region it seems as if elected governments are unwilling to make any
sort of sacrifices and certainly to toy with their popularity in pursuit of
that goal. This is very much in contrast to what used to be perceived as an
extremely attractive thing for them to be involved with. Do you think that the
problems that the core euro zone, Germany, Italy and France, are having have
in any way made people think again about the benefits of becoming a member of
that currency area?
STEVEN FRIES: I think that the reasons for the reluctance to move more quickly
in the large central European countries towards meeting the requirements for
participation in ERM II and accession to economic and monetary union are
largely domestic and reflect the tough political choices that need to be made
in order to achieve the fiscal consolidation that is required to satisfy the
deficit criterion under the Maastricht Treaty. I think the issues you refer to
in the EU15 member countries are really of secondary order of importance to
the political decisions that governments in central Europe are
making. Certainly my view, and I think the view of most forward-looking
commentators and government officials in the region, is that economic and
monetary union could deliver significant benefits to these countries over the
lung run, and I think what you are seeing is a weighing of long-term benefits
in terms of lower transaction costs in the economy, increased trade potential,
greater financial stability and less exposure to volatility emanating from
exchange-rate risk. All of those can deliver real economic benefits over the
medium to long term but to get there tough political choices have to be made
in the short term, and I think it is the reluctance to make those tough
political choices that is holding back the pace of progress in this area in
central Europe.
PAUL HANNON (Dow Jones): As a forward-looking commentator, when do you see any
of the big three actually joining the euro zone?
To follow up on the point that what is happening within the currency area is
not having an effect, if you make a choice there are two sides: one is the
cost and the other is the benefit. If the benefit is not easily marketable to
your voters, will that not affect how easy it will be for you to convince them
that the pain in the short term is worth it? I was wondering whether the lack
of an apparent return in the existing euro zone was making it more difficult
for these guys to justify short-term pain in order to achieve … To achieve
what exactly? If the evidence from the existing 12 is anything to go by, it is
not exactly a simple case to put, is it? There are not any definitive riches
at the end of the rainbow here.
STEVEN FRIES: At first glance your argument is that the sluggish performance
of the euro zone is not much of an inducement for the new member states to
adopt the euro, but I think you might need to take a more nuanced look at the
issue. I think the sluggish growth in the euro zone is due to a number of
factors and not primarily to the single currency itself. The need for a
structural reform agenda in the EU15 in order to make the economies more
flexible and more dynamic and to increase the pace of adjustment in those
countries is well known. I think that the slow growth in the EU15 is really
due to the structural obstacles to growth in those countries. I do not think
you would want to simply extrapolate for the EU8 that accession to economic
and monetary union could not deliver strong benefits. I think the obvious
counter example would be to look at the Baltics. They have been running
currency boards, having not quite adopted the euro as a currency, but they
have run credibly pegged exchange-rate regimes and have been able to grow
quite fast and to converge at a very brisk rate to the EU15. If you took a
close look at these issues, I think you would still sensibly conclude that,
despite the clear structural problems in the EU15, the EU8 could benefit from
participation in the euro, for the reasons I set out, namely the classic
benefits from monetary union.
PAUL HANNON (Dow Jones): What is your view with regard to the timing?
STEVEN FRIES: As fast as politics allow, really. I think that sensible
observers would say 2010 to 2012. Clearly, the pace of fiscal consolidation
will be a gradual one, for the political reasons that we have already
discussed.
ANDRZES SWIDLICKI (Polish News Agency): In your report you emphasise the need
to commercialise and privatise segments of the health service, if not the
whole health service. How important is this issue in terms of prioritisation?
Should it take precedence over other reforms or should it be done
simultaneously? How important is the whole issue for the region?
STEVEN FRIES: I think the key idea here is the importance of delivering better
value for money in terms of public expenditure. Clearly, the size of
government in Poland and other central European countries is quite large when
government revenue and government spending is looked at as a share of GDP, but
it is not at all clear that governments are able to deliver the quality and
level of service that would go along with having such a large role of
government in the overall economy. I think the key challenge here is to step
up and improve the delivery of public services in health, education and other
key areas which we know are important from the longer-term perspective of the
countries. I think that that is the key idea here: it is a priority, it has a
fiscal dimension in that greater efficiency in spending on health and
education can support greater fiscal consolidation, but there is also an
improved public service delivery perspective on these issues. And a key
challenge is to improve the organisation and delivery of service to meet the
real needs of the Polish people and people throughout the region.
GABRIEL ROZENBERG (The Times): You said that labour constraints, skill
shortages and labour-market regulation are considered more of an obstacle in
mature market economies than in most transition countries. What lessons can
western Europe be taught by these transition economies? What are the areas in
which the countries in central and eastern Europe are ahead of the pack? Is it
not time for the EBRD to extend its remit to helping larger economies, such as
maybe Germany, France or Italy, move into a flexible market framework?
STEVEN FRIES: There are a number of institutions that would encourage the EU15
to move to more flexible economic frameworks. It is certainly a direction that
we think is appropriate, but obviously that is not the primary remit of the
EBRD.
The key point in the report is to understand that labour regulation has two
dimensions to it. One is the cost side, which is that it does constrain the
flexibility of businesses. When we ask local businesses across the region
whether this holds back their growth potential, the answer is, yes, and
increasingly so. That is what the 2002 and 2005 surveys have told us. When
running the survey in the more mature economies in the EU15, they say it is
even more of a problem than businesses in the EU8 countries say it is. The
business perspective is that it is perceived as a constraint that holds back
growth. The other side of that is the labour-protection side and the assurance
that it could be regarded as providing workers with greater job security and
stability.
On the other side of the coin, the point I would emphasise is that it is
important to look not only at job security but also at job creation and the
importance of creating new jobs in an economy that is flexible and open to
international competition. Here I do think there is a lesson to be learned
from the countries of the region with somewhat more flexible labour markets.
That being said, there are clearly rigidities in the labour markets,
particularly in central Europe, and high levels of structural unemployment.
ANDRE MARAWSKI (La Tribune): Let us talk about Ukraine. It is now almost a
year after the so-called orange revolution. There was initially great
excitement on the part of observers, but then the observers began to become
upset. There was a much publicised privatisation in the steel industry in
Ukraine. There have thus been ups and downs. How would you assess the
situation? What is the correct analysis?
STEVEN FRIES: I think the situation in Ukraine is a mixed one. I think that to
some extent it is an opportunity forgone. A new government came into power
with strong popular support and a mandate for change: better governance, less
corruption, more transparency. At the same time, it was clear that the
government struggled to put forward a coherent and comprehensive reform
strategy. There were disagreements within the government that limited its
capacity to move forward strongly. There has recently been a change in
government and there is now perhaps the potential to unblock the situation,
although we are looking at a new round of elections in Ukraine in 2006 so I
think the ambitions for change going forward should be rather modest.
I think the one encouraging development in Ukraine is the reprivatisation of
the Kryvorizhstal steelworks. Clearly, it was taken back into state ownership
through a judicial process, so the rules of law and property rights were
protected. The second sale of these assets, which were originally sold for
about 800 million, took place about 18 months or two years later for 4.8
billion. Clearly, Yushchenko and the new government have delivered much better
value for money for the Ukrainian taxpayer. It is certainly better from the
fiscal perspective, with significant inflow of resources to the government
coffers which can be used to meet other objectives. Looking forward, the
steelworks have a strategic owner who, as we have seen in Kazakhstan and
Romania, is likely to add real value to the operations of the company, rather
than people who were selected not for their business acumen but for other,
obvious reasons.
PAUL HANNON (Dow Jones): I understand that President Putin has just reshuffled
his cabinet and people are looking forward to elections in 2007. What do you
think can now be accomplished in Russia in terms of diversifying away from
natural resources? Has this period of high natural-resource prices been an
entirely missed opportunity from that point of view? What will be the
consequences in the next round of government by whoever succeeds Putin, if he
genuinely is not going to stand again?
STEVEN FRIES: I would not characterise the period of high oil prices as a
missed opportunity. At least looking back in Russia, to the government’s
credit, they have largely saved the oil windfall gains that have accrued to
the economy and, at least until now – I am not looking forward to the 2006
budget – they have allowed the natural resource wealth that has accrued to
float into the government coffers in a prudent way. The fiscal position has
been strong; there is a large surplus. Significant amounts of external debt
have been paid down, which takes some of the pressure off for real
appreciation of the currency, though those pressures are clearly still
apparent in the Russian economy and increasingly a problem. If you look at the
composition of growth in the Russian economy, at the sectors which are growing
rapidly and those which are slowing down, you see a clear kind of Dutch
disease story emerge, in the sense that the non-tradable sectors, the service
sectors and the construction sector, are those that are growing at
double-digit rates whereas the tradable sectors, manufacturing and other
traded goods, are the ones that are slowing quite markedly. There are clear
indications of real appreciation beginning to affect the competitiveness and
diversification of the Russian economy.
The key thing going forward is to continue to manage the natural-resource
wealth in a prudent way and to implement reforms that help boost and improve
the competitiveness of the Russian economy. Clearly, less uncertainty in the
regulatory framework, better functioning courts, less bureaucratic red tape
and all the issues that we emphasise in improving the business environment
could help boost the competitiveness of Russian firms.
What is more worrying is the pressure to step up spending from the Russian
budget for consumption, increased wages and pensions. It is clearly right that
they rise with the real growth of the economy, but moderation needs to be
exercised in those areas. The 2006 budget emphasises greater spending on
health and education where there are clear social needs, but again this needs
to be balanced from a macroeconomic perspective to ensure that it does not
fuel and add to the competitiveness problems. There has been some talk of VAT
rate cuts going forward and other types of policy changes that would fuel
consumption rather than boost investment and competitiveness, and those are
greater sources of concern. The eye firmly needs to be kept on the issue of
competitiveness and diversification of the Russian economy. Going forward, it
is crucial that policies remain as supportive as possible of that objective.
DANIEL BASES (Reuters): It is quite nice to have 5.3 per cent growth, but it
is down over a percentage point for the year. Could you go into a little more
detail, beyond just the fact that there is a global growth slowdown? The
global growth slowdown may or may not be more protracted in this area. How
would you balance it, by saying “Yes, it is slowing but it is not slowing as
much”, or “It is slowing more than …”? I am trying to find out the details
behind why it is slowing.
MR STEVEN FRIES: The key issue here is that much of the slowdown is
concentrated in the CIS countries. We are forecasting growth of 6.1 per cent
for the CIS countries this year; I think it was 7 per cent or 7.5 per cent
last year. Much of the slowdown is concentrated in the CIS countries,
including Russia. In Russia I think the story is the one I described in
response to Paul Hannon’s question, where we see a slowdown in parts of the
industrial sector due to the rising real appreciation of the rouble and loss
of competitiveness. That is the key source of the growth slowdown in Russia
and in Kazakhstan to some extent, as well.
The other key area of slowdown in growth was Ukraine, which went from double
digit growth to 5 per cent growth in the current year. There is a combination
of reining back some of the fiscal excesses that the previous government had
committed in the run-up to the elections and some loss of growth in key export
markets for Ukraine.
DANIEL BASES (Reuters): You mentioned that Russia is the only country to be
downgraded on a transition basis. Do you see that trend continuing? Do you see
the beginning of a turn in the development of this country? How low will it go?
STEVEN FRIES: I think the picture that we portray of Russia in the report is a
mixed one. There is clearly the downgrade but there is also the upgrade. Let
me start with the positive and then talk about the negative.
The positive development in Russia was the movement in banking reform, in
particular the implementation of the deposit insurance scheme, the relicensing
of banks, the raising of prudential standards, the introduction of
international accounting, and so forth. That is an area where the government
clearly took a strong step forward.
The area in which there was backtracking was in large-scale privatisation.
Here I am sure you all know very well the story of the taking back into state
ownership of key assets of Yukos and their ultimately ending up in Rosneft.
The second element of the story is the re-establishment of majority
state-ownership of Gazprom. Looking forward, there could be a third element of
this story, namely the acquisition of Sibneft by Gazprom, which would take
that private oil company back into majority state hands. In what is viewed as
a strategic sector for the Russian economy there is clear movement towards
greater state ownership and control and greater direct state command over the
flow of resources in the economy.
Do I think that this is the beginning of a more widespread trend in Russia?
No, I think that where we see key elements of state control in the Russian
economy is in the energy sector and in the banking sector, where state
institutions still have a dominant role. Beyond what is considered to be
strategic from that narrow perspective, I do not anticipate a wholesale
reversal, taking more assets back into state ownership; but, that being said,
I think that the moves we have seen are a step backwards for the Russian
economy. There is clear evidence, particularly in the oil sector, that private
Russian oil companies have been much more efficient and more productive,
raising their productivity at a much more rapid rate than the state-owned
companies are, and investing more. This is, in a sense, a lost opportunity for
the Russians to make the most of their natural resource wealth. I think they
are heading in a direction that will make this sector less efficient and less
dynamic than it otherwise could have been.
DANIEL BASES (Reuters): If banking and oil are the key industries that are
considered crucial to Russian policies going forward, is that to say that the
reforms and the progress that we saw this year, which you highlighted in the
report, are vulnerable to being undone?
STEVEN FRIES: No, I do not think they are vulnerable to being undone. I think
the challenge for the banking sector going forward is to diminish the role of
the dominant state institutions and to foster more competition, more
efficiency and better delivery of service in the financial sector. I think
that clearly the reforms we have seen so far will help improve competitive
pressures within the banking sector itself. Sberbank no longer has a monopoly
in terms of state deposit insurance, and that will create a more even playing
field for attracting deposits and make the market more competitive. The points
I would make about policies going forward are similar to the points I made on
the energy sector. There is abundant evidence right across the region that
private banks, foreign-owned banks, are really the engine of productivity
gains and growth in a whole range of sectors, including the banking sector,
and movement in that direction, with greater openness to foreign entry into
the sector and ultimately privatisation of the state-owned banks, would be the
right way to move forward. I think that the steps that have been taken so far
are supportive of moving in that direction, and I do not think that they will
be reversed.
PAUL HANNON (Dow Jones): I have a technical question about Russia and the
report. You give a figure for private sector share of GDP in mid-2005 as 65
per cent, which you say is a drop from last year. Do you know what last year’s
figure was?
A SPEAKER (Off microphone): It was 70 per cent.
PAUL HANNON (Dow Jones): So it has moved from 70 per cent to 65 per cent in
one year.
SPEAKER: (Off microphone) And that is the counterpart to the taking back into
state ownership of key oil and gas assets.
PAUL HANNON (Dow Jones): Just to be clear, from this table it is the only
country in the region where the share of the private sector has actually gone
down.
SPEAKER (Off microphone): Yes. In the distant past it has happened in other
countries.
PAUL HANNON (Dow Jones): But not over this year.
SPEAKER (Off microphone): … (inaudible) …
SAM FANKHAUSER: I should perhaps say that these figures come with a bit of a
health warning. They do not have the same level of accuracy that you would
expect with figures that come from national accounts. These are EBRD estimates.
PAUL HANNON (Dow Jones): But the direction is clear.
SAM FANKHAUSER: The direction is clear. We know, for example, what the share
of Gazprom in the Russian GDP is. Five per cent is not a bad estimate.