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Abstract
This paper examines the role of trust in transition. Trust is an important
ingredient in the institutional infrastructure of a market economy. Trust
between economic actors allows efficient trade to take place in the face of
uncertainty and constrains opportunistic behaviour. Trust in state
institutions reduces the costs of rule enforcement and supports collective
action. A key message of the paper is that what is needed in a modern market
economy, characterised by a complex division of labour, is extended trust,
beyond the closed circles of family or existing business contacts. With
reference to the countries of central and eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union, the paper argues that they face heavy legacies of distrust in the state
and closed social and business networks which reduce competitive pressures on
existing enterprises to adjust. A key challenge for successful transition is
to rebuild confidence in government and provide a minimum level of rule
enforcement, which would lower the risk for economic actors to break out of
existing networks in search of new economic opportunities. The paper also
examines other determinants of trust in transition, such as moral leadership
by the government, constitutional safeguards for open and democratic
government, and redistributive policies that lower social distance among
various groups in society.
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