|
Abstract
This paper offers a first comprehensive analysis of legal change in
shareholder and creditor rights protection in transition economies and its
impact on the propensity of firms to raise external finance. The paper uses
the investor rights indices developed by La Porta et al. (1998) as a starting
point, but expands them to capture a greater range of potential conflicts
between different stakeholders of the firm. It supplements the analysis of the
law on the books with an analysis of the effectiveness of legal institutions
(legality). For assessing financial market development we use common measures
of stock and credit market development. We find that external finance is still
very underdeveloped in transition economies, despite legal change that has
substantially improved shareholder and creditor rights. The only legal index
with a significant positive impact on capital market development is the index
that codes securities legislation (SMINTEGR). There is also some indication
that credit market development benefited from improvements in the law on the
books. The effectiveness of legal institutions (legality) has a much stronger
impact on external finance than the law on the books. This is true especially
for debt, but also for equity finance. This finding contrasts with studies in
market economies showing that the quantitative effect of the law on the books
is greater than legality at least for capital market development (La Porta et
al. 1997; Levine 1998). Instead, it supports the proposition that legal
transplants and extensive legal reforms are not sufficient for the evolution
of effective legal and market institutions (Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard,
1999).
|